Is this corruption- Egyptian reformist minister becomes World Bank MD?

Egyptian minister becomes World Bank's Managing Director;

“Mahmoud Mohieldin has proven himself a tireless reformer whose work on economic and financial reform helped Egypt weather the global financial crisis. An outstanding young leader, his first hand experience of development and of the World Bank -- both as Minister and as World Bank Governor -will serve us well as we undertake our own reform program and scale-up our client focus,” said Zoellick.

No it's not. He was a regular feature on World Bank's PREM Weeks and other events. A PhD from Warwick, it's an excellent choice. Congratulations Mr.Mohieldin. A true practioner in every sense.

Related:
Interview with H. E. Mahmoud Mohieldin

We put specific timelines. We didn’t really hesitate to continue with the reforms despite the criticism at the beginning, and I have to admit that we are very lucky, because when we were conducting these reform measures, we were expecting that their impact on investment and growth was going to be taking at least three to four years. It actually took around two to three years, because of the benign emerging markets environment, and the fact that the economy at large was recovering from a long period of recession. And so with elements of recovery, a benign emerging markets environment, and credible economic policies, we managed to achieve what we have achieved so far...

It’s led by the minister of finance, with my membership, the minister of economic development, minister of trade and industry, governor of central bank.We meet every Monday evening.

On the Reform of Business Environment: The Case of Egypt

Videos:
An Egypt Case Study of Financial Sector Reform

PREM Week 2005: Session 05 - Why Do Economies Grow?

Internal Brain Drain: Why Gender Inclusion Matters for Growth

How to Reform the Business Environment

Getting Economic Reforms done- Uganda Experience

My six-year reform experience was like driving a reform bus on a long journey, eliciting passengers along the way to a shared destination

-Florence Kuteesa

An interesting book on Ugandan Economic Reforms;
Uganda's Economic Reforms -Insider Accounts;

1. Overview of Ugandan Economic Reform since 1986
This synthesis chapter draws out the main findings from the individual chapters. After much agonizing over the direction of economic policy, three fundamental reforms between 1990 and 1992 —legalization of the parallel foreign exchange market, liberalization of coffee marketing, and the establishment of fiscal discipline — brought macroeconomic stability. Together with trade liberalization and privatization, Uganda was set on the road to a liberal, capitalist economy. Concern that growth was bypassing the poor led to a focus on poverty reduction between the mid 1990s and early 2000s. Measures such as decentralization, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, the Poverty Action Fund, and Sector Working Groups succeeded in attracting increased aid and channeling it into poverty reduction. Sound economic management and a clear commitment to poverty reduction together explain why Uganda was the first beneficiary of both HIPC debt relief and the shift from project aid to budget support. The resulting increase in public service delivery contributed to rapid poverty reduction. The pace of reform has eased since 2002. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the crucial importance of political support for successful economic reform.

2. Institutional and Political Dimensions of Economic Reform
This chapter provides the institutional and political context for the technical reforms discussed in subsequent chapters. It summarizes the abortive attempts at reform of the Obote II government and discusses changes made by the NRM to the economic institutions it inherited in 1986. The long, heated debate over the direction of economic policy was resolved with the merger of the finance and planning ministries and the establishment of fiscal discipline in 1992. The critical role of the President in key economic decisions such as fiscal discipline, the commitment to poverty reduction, and the sale of Uganda Commercial Bank is highlighted. The role of Parliament has increased with the restoration of democracy. The chapter also examines how the finance and planning ministry became one of the strongest in Africa.

3. Exchange Rate, Fiscal, and Monetary Policy
This chapter identifies three phases in Uganda's transformation from a war-torn economy into one that has sustained rapid growth and low inflation since 1992. There were two major reforms in the early 1990s. First the parallel foreign exchange market was legalized in 1990. Following the merger of the finance and planning ministries in 1992, a sharp fiscal adjustment established fiscal discipline and reduced inflation to single figures. The second phase was one of unconventional macro policy for the rest of the 1990s. With little scope for monetary policy, low inflation was sustained largely by tight, short-term fiscal control. In the 2000s, financial deepening and budget reforms have provided a foundation for a more orthodox mix of fiscal and monetary policy.

4. Public Service Restructuring and Pay Reform
This chapter discusses two elements of Public Service reform of particular relevance to the overall economic reform programme the restructuring of the Public Service and pay reform. It highlights the halving of the size of the Public Service between 1990 and 1995 and the subsequent increase following the Poverty Eradication Action Plan commitment to increased provision of basic public services. It also looks at the collapse in real wages during the 1980s and examines progress towards paying public servants a ‘living wage’.

5. Tax Reform
By 1990 tax revenue in Uganda had declined to 5% of GDP. Revenue was heavily dependent on export taxes, which discouraged exports. This chapter discusses the policy and administrative measures taken during the 1990s to make the tax system more transparent and productive. Export taxes were replaced by import taxes, which were progressively reduced to relatively low levels. The most significant single reform was the introduction of Value Added Tax in 1996. Despite initial resistance by traders, strong political support enabled VAT to take root. The Uganda Revenue Authority has spearheaded revenue administration reform since 1991. This chapter discusses the key drivers in setting up an autonomous revenue agency, the successes and challenges in revenue administration, and what could have been done better. It also looks at the challenges and lessons of implementing VAT in an environment of low tax compliance.

6. Planning and Development Budget Reform, 1990–1995
The NRA victory triggered substantial aid flows, accounting for over half of public expenditure. However, the planning and budgeting systems had collapsed,; so donors largely did their own thing and much aid was ineffective. This chapter describes the measures adopted to establish some order and bring government policy priorities to bear on donor allocations and public expenditure generally. It discusses the key reforms, designed to attract increased aid and improve the effectiveness of all public expenditure: the merger of the finance and planning ministries; consolidating responsibility for sector policy, planning, and budgeting in a single division; capturing aid in the plan and budget; integration of the plan and development budget; establishment of internal review processes and the challenge function; and management of counterpart funding. Aspects of Uganda's ‘legacy’ are highlighted, such as: the Paris Declaration principle that aid should align behind government plans; the PIP as the forerunner of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan and poverty reduction strategies; linking plan and budget; and Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys.

7. The Poverty Eradication Action Plan
Uganda was a pioneer in designing a holistic, comprehensive development plan targeted at poverty eradication. The 1997 Poverty Eradication Action Plan was the original prototype ‘poverty reduction strategy’, which is now a prerequisite for countries wishing to access HIPC, World Bank, IMF, and other donor support. This chapter shows how the PEAP developed from the Public Investment Plan of the early 1990s through an extensive consultative process. It discusses the influence of the PEAP on resource allocation and sector policies. It describes how the PEAP has evolved during subsequent revisions, the changes in the institutional framework for planning and monitoring, and the efforts to maintain the relevance of the PEAP over time.

8. Budget Reform and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework
The initial budget reforms from 1992, aimed at establishing macroeconomic stability and credibility of the budget, focused on the short term. This chapter shows how, once these immediate targets were achieved, the finance and planning ministry gradually implemented a Medium Term Expenditure Framework. This was intended to facilitate a realignment of public expenditure in line with the political priorities set out in the Poverty Eradication Action Plan and to improve the predictability of public funds, while adhering to the aggregate resource envelope. The chapter examines trends in sector allocations, to assess whether the MTEF facilitated significant shifts, and looks at progress towards improving the predictability of the budget. It also discusses the pioneering measures taken to promote public and political consultation on the budget. Other reforms discussed include the virtual Poverty Action Fund, output oriented budgeting, fiscal transfers to local government, and public expenditure reviews.

9. Sector Wide Approach and Sector Working Groups
Once fiscal discipline had been restored and basic expenditure management systems established at the central level, the finance and planning ministry increasingly turned its attention to expenditure at the sector level. This chapter discusses the evolution of Sector Working Groups and Sector Wide Approaches. It shows how responsibility for drawing up sector policy and expenditure priorities was increasingly delegated to SWGs. These were led by sector ministries but included representatives from other government institutions in the sector, the finance ministry, donors, and civil society. They assumed an increasingly important formal role in determining sector allocations in the budget process. The chapter shows how SWAps emerged as a mechanism which fused the policy, planning and budget processes through the development of inclusive sector investment plans, budgets to implement those plans, and joint monitoring mechanisms. They helped develop common donor approaches within sectors, improving alignment to government policies, and promoting the use of government systems.

10. Poverty Monitoring
Political concern that rapid economic growth did not appear to be benefiting the poor led to an increased focus in the mid-1990s on ensuring public expenditure was pro-poor and on monitoring poverty trends. This chapter discusses the measures adopted to increase the poverty focus of the budget. It also looks at the institutional arrangements and the methods used to monitor poverty trends. Household survey data shows that between 1992 and 2006 Uganda experienced one of the largest and fastest reductions in income poverty recorded anywhere in modern times. Participatory Poverty Assessments, which were pioneered in Uganda, and other non-quantitative methods illustrate the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and the unevenness of progress towards poverty reduction.

11. Statistics Reform
Many of the economic reforms were dependent on reliable statistics. Like many other government systems, statistics collection virtually collapsed during the 1970s. This chapter shows how systems for collecting, analysing, and disseminating official statistics have been rebuilt since the late 1980s. It starts with a historical review of statistics institutional development before going on to look at the main categories of statistics currently collected, and at their analysis and dissemination.

12. Debt Management and Debt Relief
This chapter shows how the rapid accumulation of debt from 1986 led to a debt crisis in 1990. It discusses the debt management strategies adopted following the crisis to ensure that it would not recur. Paris Club rescheduling and commercial debt buy-back helped reduce the stock of arrears. However, this increased the share of multilateral debt, which could not be rescheduled, to 75%. Uganda was in the vanguard of the debt relief movement of the 1990s, which culminated in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative, and was the first country to benefit from HIPC. This chapter shows how sound economic management and a strong commitment to poverty reduction underpinned the case for multilateral debt relief in a country where debt was vividly crowding out social expenditure. It also looks at Uganda's role in the HIPC initiative and shows the impact of debt relief on debt service costs.

13. Aligning Aid with Government Fiscal Objectives
This chapter evaluates efforts by the government to encourage donors to shift their aid into budget support and to ensure that aid flows were consistent with the government's macroeconomic objectives for fiscal policy and its strategic expenditure priorities. Aid to Uganda rose sharply in the second half of the 1990s, funding a major expansion of public expenditure. This was accompanied by a shift in aid modalities, from projects to budget support, in line with government preferences. Uganda was in the forefront of the rapid growth in budget support, which has been one of the most profound developments in the aid business in recent years. The chapter examines the key institutional reforms intended to encourage the shift towards budget support and looks at some of the problems encountered with aligning budget support with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework. It also examines the reasons for government's strategic objective of reducing the budget's dependence on donor aid.

14. Fiscal Decentralization
In the 1990s Uganda embarked on an ambitious programme of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralisationization reforms as a means of rebuilding and expanding the delivery of basic services, and fostering local democracy and accountability. This chapter examines the roots and evolution of the reforms, focusing on the fiscal side of decentralisationization. It examines how a rapid expansion in central grants helped support the expansion of basic services, the tension between centralised funding and local autonomy, the stagnation of local taxation, the incentives for and establishment of public financial management capacity, and the evolution of planning and budgeting systems. It concludes by asking whether the decentralisationization process was managed in a way that helped or hindered the expansion of basic services.

15. Financial Management and Accountability Reform
Macroeconomic stability and increased growth were achieved in the early 1990s despite very weak financial management and accountability systems. This chapter shows how these weaknesses became even more pronounced following the adoption of the 1995 Constitution, decentralization, expanding budgetary demands, and the requirements of the Poverty Eradication Acton Plan, among others. Strengthening public financial management and accountability was critical if progress was to be sustained and if donors were to be persuaded to channel more aid through government systems. Yet in 1998 the entire government had just two professional accountants. The chapter presents the key reforms adopted to strengthen financial management and accountability, looking at changes in the areas of the legal and policy framework, institutional capacity building, and processes and systems, particularly the introduction of the Integrated Financial Management System.

16. Privatization and Parastatal Reform
By the late 1980s Uganda's large public enterprise sector had become a major drain on the Treasury and a bottleneck to economic growth. To address this situation the government embarked on a major privatization and public enterprise reform programme in 1993. By 2005 the programme was largely complete and most public enterprises had been privatized, reformed, or closed down. This chapter discusses the key issues, reforms, and institutions that were central to the divestiture and reform of public enterprises. The implementation process is discussed along with the various methods adopted, the numbers that were divested and the proceeds from the process. The chapter identifies the key challenges faced during the process and assesses the impact of the reforms on issues such as government finances and post-divestiture performance. It concludes with an appendix on utility reform.

Why is Peter Orszag leaving?

Mr. Orszag, you may recall, was the administration’s main proponent of “bending the curve” on health care expenditures. Frustrated that House Democrats wouldn’t accept some painful cost-cutting measures in the new health care law, Mr. Orszag pushed for and won a controversial provision to create something called the Independent Payment Advisory Board. This is an outside commission of 15 appointees who will, beginning in 2014, identify cuts to Medicare if the plan exceeds a preset rate for growth. Congress then has to either approve the cuts or propose an alternative.

The significance of this new advisory board goes well beyond the immediate question of how to rein in Medicare costs. Mr. Orszag, who declined to be interviewed, has said that the board represented, for Congress, the “single-biggest yielding of power to an independent entity since the creation of the Federal Reserve.” In other words, the Medicare Board isn’t only a means of cutting government spending; it is a means, too, of wresting the constitutional responsibility for budgeting away from powerful committee chairmen.

The Medicare Board may be the most striking example of this strategy, but it is hardly the only one. Mr. Orszag also helped broker the creation of an 18-member debt commission that will offer specific alternatives for re-ordering the federal budget. The administration has also proposed a bill — known in the punchy language of Washington as “expedited rescission authority” — that would effectively give the president the power to strike out spending items after the budget has been approved.

-Budget Chief tried to tilt power to Executive Branch

Can WikiLeaks model work for the government

He had come to understand the defining human struggle not as left versus right, or faith versus reason, but as individual versus institution. As a student of Kafka, Koestler, and Solzhenitsyn, he believed that truth, creativity, love, and compassion are corrupted by institutional hierarchies, and by “patronage networks”—one of his favorite expressions—that contort the human spirit. He sketched out a manifesto of sorts, titled “Conspiracy as Governance,” which sought to apply graph theory to politics. Assange wrote that illegitimate governance was by definition conspiratorial—the product of functionaries in “collaborative secrecy, working to the detriment of a population.” He argued that, when a regime’s lines of internal communication are disrupted, the information flow among conspirators must dwindle, and that, as the flow approaches zero, the conspiracy dissolves. Leaks were an instrument of information warfare.

These ideas soon evolved into WikiLeaks. In 2006, Assange barricaded himself in a house near the university and began to work. In fits of creativity, he would write out flow diagrams for the system on the walls and doors, so as not to forget them. There was a bed in the kitchen, and he invited backpackers passing through campus to stay with him, in exchange for help building the site. “He wouldn’t sleep at all,” a person who was living in the house told me. “He wouldn’t eat.”

As it now functions, the Web site is primarily hosted on a Swedish Internet service provider called PRQ.se, which was created to withstand both legal pressure and cyber attacks, and which fiercely preserves the anonymity of its clients. Submissions are routed first through PRQ, then to a WikiLeaks server in Belgium, and then on to “another country that has some beneficial laws,” Assange told me, where they are removed at “end-point machines” and stored elsewhere. These machines are maintained by exceptionally secretive engineers, the high priesthood of WikiLeaks. One of them, who would speak only by encrypted chat, told me that Assange and the other public members of WikiLeaks “do not have access to certain parts of the system as a measure to protect them and us.” The entire pipeline, along with the submissions moving through it, is encrypted, and the traffic is kept anonymous by means of a modified version of the Tor network, which sends Internet traffic through “virtual tunnels” that are extremely private. Moreover, at any given time WikiLeaks computers are feeding hundreds of thousands of fake submissions through these tunnels, obscuring the real documents. Assange told me that there are still vulnerabilities, but “this is vastly more secure than any banking network.”

Before launching the site, Assange needed to show potential contributors that it was viable. One of the WikiLeaks activists owned a server that was being used as a node for the Tor network. Millions of secret transmissions passed through it. The activist noticed that hackers from China were using the network to gather foreign governments’ information, and began to record this traffic. Only a small fraction has ever been posted on WikiLeaks, but the initial tranche served as the site’s foundation, and Assange was able to say, “We have received over one million documents from thirteen countries.”

-Julian Assange’s mission for total transparency

Related:
WikiLeaks on Twitter

Wikileaks and Iceland MPs propose 'journalism haven'

The Winston Wolf of Public Management

An interesting profile of US Defense Secretary;

In his memoir Speech-less, Matt Latimer, a speechwriter for both Rumsfeld and Bush, describes Gates as "our Winston Wolf," the Harvey Keitel character in Pulp Fiction who comes to dispose of the bodies and take care of the bloody mess after an accidental killing. "Wolf was a case study of robotic efficiency, overseeing an elaborate cleanup while calmly drinking a cup of coffee," writes Latimer. "That's what President Bush wanted — a cold-blooded competent cleaner."

The cleaner quickly went to work. He walked into the Pentagon alone. Inheriting many former Rumsfeld aides, Gates told them on his first day that he wouldn't be firing anyone. There was no time for confirmations, and he was leaving that day for Iraq. Gates brought a sense of relief, a feeling that an adult was back in charge...

One of the things his staffers love about him is his common sense, I-don't-get-it attitude toward the stupidity of bureaucracy. Now that he's past worrying about climbing within that bureaucracy, he has the confidence to break it. At the height of the Iraq surge in 2007, which Gates supported, more than 100 soldiers a month were dying. It's almost impossible as an outsider to understand why the Pentagon would not want to build the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, known as MRAPs, that would have saved many of those soldiers' lives. Instead of budgeting for MRAPs, the Pentagon was still spending money on outdated weapon systems. So Gates bypassed the normal procurement process, created a special task force, went to Congress and got the money to build them. "Those vehicles saved hundreds of lives and limbs," says a senior Pentagon official...

The list of mindless bureaucratic obstacles that were hampering the war effort was dizzying. For example: military officers complained that there were not enough drones, Predators and unmanned reconnaissance in the air to help target insurgent cells. The holdup? Air Force pilots are taught to fly real planes, not drones. Each pilot costs about $1 million to train. And yet some staff sergeants in the Army had started operating the drones at a fraction of the price, with far fewer crashes. "If the Army is doing it safer and cheaper and able to produce more pilots faster, why aren't we doing it to that standard?" Gates asked. "This requires a cultural revolution in the Air Force," explained one of his staffers — which it got in 2008, after Gates fired the civilian and military leaders of the service for other reasons. Now the Air Force licenses junior officers to fly unmanned aircraft, and Gates has tripled the number of drones operating in the war zones...

Gates is a man of old-school habits: a Grey Goose at the end of the day and preferably steak or bacon cheeseburgers for lunch and dinner. He doesn't use a cell phone. He asked me during our interview if there was tape in my digital recorder. Gates keeps a box filled with index cards of quotes and anecdotes and one-liners he's collected over the years. His favorite comedians are both dead — George Carlin and W.C. Fields. Their sensibilities suit Gates' own — taking down institutions, puncturing pomp. He's even adopted some of their style. He loves to tell the same jokes about egos in Washington — "where people say, I'll double-cross that bridge when I get to it," and "the only place in the world you can see a prominent person walking down lovers' lane holding his own hand."...

At the height of the Iraq surge, Gates gave a speech to the Marine Corps Association. He began in Johnny Carson fashion with a long, meticulously timed story about Nixon's Secretary of Defense Mel Laird on a trip to see the Pope.

Laird was smoking a cigar, and Henry Kissinger told him to at least put it out before they went inside. "A couple of minutes into the Pope's remarks, Kissinger heard this little patting sound, and he looked over, and there was a wisp of smoke coming out of Laird's pocket. The Secretary of Defense was on fire. The American party heard this slapping and thought they were being cued to applaud. And so they did. And Henry later told us, 'God only knows what His Holiness thought, seeing the American Secretary of Defense immolating himself, and the entire American party applauding the fact.' "...

Like Obama, Gates can consume reams of information. His photographic memory is legendary. He is a voracious reader of history, spy novels and pulp fiction. He's subscribed to the Book-of-the-Month Club for 50 years. And he is careful, meticulously so. One decades-long colleague told me Gates will cancel a briefing if he hasn't done his homework. "Preparation for him is a cathartic experience," says his spokesman Morrell. He vents brutal answers to imaginary questions so he can be more diplomatic on the Hill. He's vigilant about the stagecraft of statecraft, even taking his own messy handwritten notes to meetings so his preparation can be seen...

What did Gates ask the President-elect? "I asked him if he could trust me."

Effective Habits from the Budget Man

A profile of Peter Orszag in NYT;

“He’s made nerdy sexy,” said Rahm Emanuel, the White House chief of staff.

Mr. Orszag, who grew up in Lexington, Mass., has always worked himself punishingly hard — a legacy, he says, from a math-professor father who glanced at test scores of 98 and asked about the 2 other points. “It was always, ‘When I was your age, I was a tenured professor,’ ” he said.

When he won a Marshall scholarship, his father congratulated him by admitting that the award was “not trivial.” Later he discovered that his father had once been turned down for the prize, which finances graduate study in Britain. (Mr. Orszag earned master’s and doctoral degrees at the London School of Economics.)

In classic political fashion, Mr. Orszag trained for Washington rivalry through family rivalry, not just with his father but also with his economist brothers. Peter, Michael and Jonathan Orszag have worked and written papers together and still compare electronic gadgets and their Princeton grade-point averages...

Friends say his dinner parties are notable for the meticulously chosen wines and the senators who attend. (Mr. Orszag, a divorced father of two, is so cozy with the Capitol Hill crowd that Senator Ron Wyden and his wife, Nancy Bass Wyden, found him a girlfriend.)...

So far, his main project has been the budget, drafted in meetings that began before the inauguration. For weeks after Mr. Obama took office, Mr. Orszag sat directly across the table from him in the Roosevelt Room. He began each session with a series of PowerPoint slides, defined the president’s options and constantly jotted down requests on notecards.

For someone with two BlackBerrys — work and personal — clipped to the small of his back, Mr. Orszag seems governed by little cards: the ones in his breast pocket for notes, another that lists his meetings, a tiny hand-lettered one that materializes to summon him to the Oval Office....

His own health care conversion occurred when a doctor told him several years ago that he was at risk for cardiovascular problems. Mr. Orszag changed his diet. Each day he eats the same egg whites for breakfast and salad topped with chicken for dinner, all from the White House mess.

He also began training for marathons, sometimes startling colleagues by appearing in their offices at day’s end in head-to-toe spandex.

Now he keeps two books on his desk: the teachings of Epictetus, a Greek Stoic philosopher who espoused dispassion and self-discipline, and “The Strenuous Life,” by Theodore Roosevelt, an ode to pushing oneself as hard as possible.