Showing posts with label Argentina. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Argentina. Show all posts

Friday, September 5, 2008

Nothing new for Argentina

Argentina’s overdue loans from the Paris Club nations, principally Japan and Germany, have represented a serious obstacle to its medium-term growth potential. While the country was in arrears, the export-promotion agencies of many foreign governments were banned from providing subsidised credit for sales or investments in Argentina. Now, it will be eligible for such loans, substantially lowering financing and insurance costs for infrastructure projects and imports of capital goods. In particular, the move should expedite the construction of a high-speed rail line linking the country’s three largest cities, a costly project of questionable necessity strongly backed by Ms Fernández. “We haven’t been getting big investments of hundreds of millions of dollars because they need international financing,” says Beatriz Nofal, the president of the government’s investment-promotion agency. “Now they’ll start coming.”

But the mechanism Ms Fernández has chosen for repaying the debts is reinforcing widely held concerns about Argentina’s economic management. Just as her husband did when repaying the government’s debt with the IMF in 2005, Ms Fernández has rustled up the cash by helping herself to 15% of the central bank’s foreign-currency reserves. In addition to highlighting the bank’s tenuous independence, this decision implies a steep opportunity cost: Argentina could easily have paid the debt in instalments rather than in one lump sum. Doing so might have spared the country the need to borrow ever-greater sums from the Venezuelan government, which now charges a daunting 15% interest rate.

But according to the Paris Club’s rules, securing any such restructuring with the group would require the blessing of the IMF, which has long been the Kirchners’ favourite political scapegoat. And in turn, to obtain the Fund’s approval, Argentina would probably have had to reveal how it calculates its official inflation figure, which is manipulated so that it hovers at around a third of the true rate. Ms Fernández remains unwilling to reveal precisely how her officials doctor Argentina’s economic statistics.

If Ms Fernández hoped that her decision would calm investors’ nerves, she appears to have been mistaken: the spread between the interest rates on Argentina’s bonds and US Treasury notes actually increased on the day she made the announcement. The markets remain jittery because Argentina’s unpaid obligations to the Paris Club were in fact among the least of its worries. The government still refuses to negotiate with the private holders of $20 billion of its bonds who held out against the country’s harsh debt restructuring in 2005, a decision that prevents it from borrowing on the international capital markets. It continues to impose strict price controls and hand out lavish energy and transport subsidies. And it suffers from a yawning credibility gap, due to lies about the inflation rate

-Satisfying the creditors

Thursday, September 4, 2008

A Classic and a must read

Sudden stops, the real exchange rate and fiscal sustainability: Argentina’s lessons;
The fall of the Convertibility Program - the currency board regime in Argentina - has been subject of much discussion. This paper aims to provide a new interpretation of the collapse of Convertibility with a special emphasis on three key structural characteristics of Argentina’s productive and financial structure and on political economy considerations.

The paper starts by explaining the role of the Russian crisis of August 1998 in changing the behavior of capital markets and in producing an unexpected and prolonged stop in capital flows (which is referred to as Sudden Stop) to emerging market economies, including Latin America. It argues that Argentina is extremely vulnerable to a Sudden Stop in capital inflows such as the one that followed the Russian crisis. Factors contributing to this vulnerability include a relatively closed economy indebtedness; a high level of indebtedness; and financial currency mismatches due to a high degree of dollarization both in the public and private sectors.

The paper then identifies key vulnerability indicators by contrasting Argentina’s performance relative to other Latin American countries that were also subject to the Sudden Stop. It also provides an explanation for the political issues that ensued after the Sudden Stop and the fiscal collapse.

Three major findings emerge from this analysis:

* economies like Argentina are vulnerable to changes in international conditions and may require large increases in equilibrium real exchange rate (RER)
* large changes in the RER could generate deep financial distress in the corporate sector and/or lead to financial problems for the public sector
* a banking crisis may be the inevitable because banks are exposed to RER changes either directly or through the public sector and its large public debt

The paper concludes with some policy lessons for Latin America that emerge from Argentina’s experience. The recommendations mentioned in the paper include:

* switching to exchange rate flexibility as a way of reducing the real effects of Sudden Stops
* dealing with unsustainable fiscal positions in order to allow the public sector to adequately respond in times of crisis
* creating markets for the issuance of debt in domestic currency not indexed to the exchange rate
* increasing trade openness